Russia Disinformation Profile
Foreign Disinformation Operations
- Russia Linked Operations in Africa 2018-Present (targets Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
- French and Russian Trolling in Africa 2020 (target French operation in Mali and the Central African Republic)
- Pro-Kremlin Anti-Foreign Vaccination Campaign 2020-present (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia, and other Russian Speaking Communities)
- Echoes Misinformation Campaign in Ukraine unclear-2020 (target countries across Europe and Central Asia)
Russia Domestic Disinformation
Russia Media Environment
Russia has a 76% internet penetration rate.[1] It was ranked 149 out of 180 in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index, Russian journalists can be harmed or murdered if they publish on sensitive topics.[2][3] The Russian media environment has been liberalizing but there are still clashes between state controlled and privately controlled media.[4]
Ilya Yablokov and Elisabeth Schimpfössl note that the current media situation in Russia as being collective product of Tsarist, Soviet and modern Russia.[5]Since Putin's election in 1999, the Russian state has sought to centralise control over the media by attacking oligarchs, such as Vladimir Gusinsky's NTV and also Boris Berezovskiy's ORT channel, in the early 2000s. [6]
Two major events are said to have been the catalyst for the state's decision to monopolise media control: 1. The August 2000 Kursk submarine disaster, which ORT coverage focused those who had lost loved ones and was critical of the state, and 2. the 2002 Moscow theatre attack, whose coverage allegedly infuriated Putin as "publicity on blood". [7] Subsequently, following the 2004 Beslan terrorist attack, the big stations downplayed the event. Lippman noted also, that after 2004, Putin became a greater focal point within media coverage. [8]
Yablokov and Schimpfössl understand today's Russian media environment as a product of "digital authoritarianism and post-truth populism" [9]. The Russian domestic media environment has contributed to why it has such successful campaigns abroad. Russian TV is largely state controlled while online the media environment is much more free. TV is the most powerful part of Russia's media environment but the internet is gaining prominence.[10] A recent poll by the Levada Centre noted that 64% of Russians find out news from the TV, 42% from online media and 39% from social networks. However these latter figures are rising (see image).[11]
This contrast has led the Russian government to use bots and trolls to try to control the discourse online domestically and gave them experience in dealing with free online discourse.[12] Furthermore, Yablokov has analysed how Russia Today (RT) employs a conspiratorial element within its newsmaking as a means to delegitimize policies of the US government. He understands this as a tool to defend Russia's own actions [13]. This reasoning conforms to the multi-polar worldview put forward by the Kremlin, which argues for the U.S. to "descend to the position of one of the great powers", rather than the dominant hegemonic world power. [14] Hence, state media outlets are used to amplify the state's preferred message and so RT has looked to provide an alternative voice within the international news space [15], presenting itself with the tagline "Question more" [16]. However, Yablokov is keen to mention that the role of these organisations like RT and their effectiveness should not be exaggerated. [17]
Many of the Russian disinformation campaigns against foreign adversaries are geared towards influencing their domestic audience.
- ↑ https://medialandscapes.org/country/russia
- ↑ https://medialandscapes.org/country/russia
- ↑ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17840134
- ↑ https://medialandscapes.org/country/russia
- ↑ Yablokov, Ilya, and Elisabeth Schimpfössl. “A Brief History of News Making in Russia.” Journalism, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920941951
- ↑ Lipman, Maria, Anna Kachkaeva, and Michael Poyker. Media in Russia: Between Modernization and Monopoly, in Treisman, Daniel, ed. The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.
- ↑ Lipman, Maria, Anna Kachkaeva, and Michael Poyker. Media in Russia: Between Modernization and Monopoly, in Treisman, Daniel, ed. The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.
- ↑ Lipman, Maria, Anna Kachkaeva, and Michael Poyker. Media in Russia: Between Modernization and Monopoly, in Treisman, Daniel, ed. The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.
- ↑ - Yablokov, Ilya, and Elisabeth Schimpfössl. “A Brief History of News Making in Russia.” Journalism, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920941951. P.7
- ↑ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17840134
- ↑ https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/02/25/social-networks-in-russia/
- ↑ https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Russia.pdf
- ↑ Yablokov, Ilya. "Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The case of Russia Today (RT)." Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015): 301-315.
- ↑ https://carnegieendowment.org/files/20_yearsWall_Eng_web206.pdf
- ↑ Yablokov, Ilya. "Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The case of Russia Today (RT)." Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015): 301-315.
- ↑ https://www.rt.com/about-us/
- ↑ Yablokov, Ilya. "Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The case of Russia Today (RT)." Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015): 301-315.